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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  analyses  the  growth  of  the public  sector  in the  European 
Community  over  the  past  twenty  years. 
Following  a  brief  introduction,  Section II provides  an  overview  of 
the  ways  in  which  both  public  spending  and  taxation  have  evolved.  Although 
tax  burdens  have  tended  to  rise in  Community  countries,  they  have  not 
matched  the  increase  in government  spending  with  the  result  that public 
deficits  have  grown.  Within  the total of  spending  the  steady  increase 
in the  share of  resources  devoted  to social  transfers and  the decline  in 
the  share  of  public  investment  is noted also. 
Section III takes  the analysis a  stage further  with  a  consideration 
of  public  expenditure  growth  in both  real  and  nominal  terms.  Various 
price deflators are discussed and  somecomparisons  drawn.  When  "own 
price" deflators are  used,  the decline  in  public  investment  and  rise  in 
transfer spending  becomes  emphasised  even  more. 
The  role of  some  possible  constraints and  what  might  be  called the 
public  "acceptability" of government  spending  is treated  in  Section  IV. 
Attention is drawn  particularly to  the operation of  the  tax  burden  overall 
together  with  the  influence which  both  real  personal  disposable  incomes 
and  "privately financed"  real  consumption  might  have. 
A small  number  of  competing  hypotheses  concerned  with  why  the  size 
of  government  has  increased  so  steadily are discussed  in  Section  V. 
Attention  is  focused  particularly on  recent  voting  model  and  income 
distribution explanationsand also on  the public  goods  - type  of 
expenditure generating  process.  The  final  section draws  together the 
various  points discussed  and  attempts  to set out  a  more  general 
appraisal  and  some  conclusions. I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At  the  present  time  the  scale and  extent  of  the  public  sector  has 
become  an  emotive  issue  in  many  countries.  Typically it is taken  to be 
an  important,  if not  the most  important,  indicator of  the  size of  govern-
ment  and  its influence over  the  wider  economy.  From  the  "New  Deal"  and 
the  spread of  the  standard  Keynesian  policy prescriptions,  public  spending 
in principle has  been  regarded  as  having  the  character of  an  inherent 
'good'.  More  recently,  however,  the  role  of  government  spending,  taxation 
and  the  consequences  for  public  debt  are being  re-appraised.  Whilst  it 
is  usual  to  look  at  the  financing  side of  government  and  refer to the 
burden  of  taxation,  the more  extreme  of the  classical macroeconomics 
school  now  seem  to want  to describe  public  sector  spending  as  a  'burden' 
also  (1).  A reduction  in  the  scale of  spending  is  interpreted as  being 
synonymous  with  a  reduction  in the  size of  government  itself which  the 
proponents  would  regard as  a  desirable objective. 
It'  is  a  common  observation that  governments  have  grown  and  grown. 
Moreover,  this expansion,  although  uneven,  has  taken place against  the 
background  of  an  enormously  wide  range  of  influences  irrespective of 
political party.  Something  which  might  be  taken  as  an  approximation 
to  'Wagners  Law'  (Wagner  1980)  does,  on  the  face  of  it, seem  to offer 
a  summary  description of  experience  in  most  of the  industrialised world. 
Across  a  wide  range  of  countries,  the elasticity of  public  expenditure 
with  respect  to  GDP  tends  to exceed  unity  which  implies  that public 
spending  is  a  'luxury'  activity  (2).  We  are still  located  somewhere  in 
the  lower  reaches  of  the  Engel  curve. 
Over  the  very  long  period,  the  uneveness  in  growth  has  been  ex-
plained  in  a  variety of  ways,  one  of  the  more  popular  and  persuasive 
being  the  'ratchet•  or  displacement  effect,  discussed  and  analysed  in 
the  major  study by  Peacock  and  Wiseman  (1961). 
(1)  See  the  comment  by  J.  Tobin  (1980)  p.  50 
(2)  See,  for  example,  R.E.  Wagner  and  W.E.  Weber  (1977),  also  Beck  (1976) 
and  OECD  (1978). -10-
Within  the  total of  public  expenditure,  increasing attention is 
being  paid  to  changes  in  its composition.  Some  of  this  interest mani-
fests  itself  in  the  form  of  attempts  to draw  a  distinction between  so-
called  'productive'  and  other  types  of  public  spending.  Occasionally 
this  seems  to spill  over  into  an  unsatisfactory statistical and  account-
ing  analogue  where  total expenditures  are  divided  into  current  and 
capitaL  outlays  with  the  latter tending to  be  associated more  with 
productive activities.  Within  the  current  spending  category,  the  roll 
of  social  transfers  has  become  a  prime  focus  of  interest. 
On  the  financing  side,  the  burden  of  taxation also  has  tended  to 
rise steadily.  In  recent  years,  however,  tax  financing  on  average  has 
not  risen at  the  same  rate as  spending  with  the  result  that  public 
sector deficits  have  grown  as  has  the  public  debt  in  relation to GOP. 
This  exercise  looks  a  little more  closely at  some  aspects  of 
those  changes  which  have  taken  place  in the growth  of  public  spending 
within  the  European  Community  over  the  past  two  decades  or  so  and 
offers  some  alternative  interpretations.  Those  who  have  ventured  into 
this  area  will  know  that  it  is one  of  the  more  treacherous  of  the  many 
national  accounting  and  statistical minefields.  Problems  of definition, 
coverage,  time  period,  price basis  and  so  on,  abound  to the extent  that 
no  one  would  go  to the  stake  in  support  of  a  claim  on  accuracy. 
Further,  in  international  comparisons  of this sort,  it is  rarely possible, 
if at all, to use  exactly the  same  time  period for all  countries  in every 
instance.  One  important  qualification  is  that  the discussion  here  does 
not  cover  the  public  corporations.  These  are  omitted  in the analysis 
Largely  on  the  grounds  that  for  many  purposes  they  are  a  worthy  subject 
for  separate  treatment.  That  said,  unless  stated otherwise,  the data 
sources  used  throughout  are  those  provided  by  the  European  Commission 
ESA  system  and  the  published  OECD  National  Accounts.  In  a  number  of 
instances,  experience  relating to the  United  States and  Japan  is  cited 
in order to  broaden  the basis  for  comparative  analysis. -11-
II.  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR  IN  EEC  COUNTRIES:  AN  OVERVIEW 
The  share  of  total  or General  Government  Expenditure  in  total 
resources  available  as  measured  by  GDP  for  EEC  countries  is given  in  Table 
I.  In eight  out  of  the  ten  Community  countries  the  rise in  the  share 
overall  through  the  seven  year  period  1973-1981,  exceeds  that  which  took 
place  over  the  longer  period  1960-1973.  This  acceleration  was  most  pro-
nounced  in  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  and  Greece  with  a  slowing  down  occurring 
in  the  Netherlands  and  the  U.K.  Typically,  however,  the  share  of  total 
expenditure  in  GDP  measured  in nominal  terms  over  the  twenty  year  period 
has  risen  from  about  30  per  cent  to  rather  more  than  50  per  cent. 
The  relationship between  the  growth  of  both  total  public  expenditure 
and  GDP  over  the  whole  period  is  illustrated  in  Chart  1.  It will  be 
noted  that all of  the  points  plotted  Lie  above  the  ray  of  unitary elasti-
city and  on  average  the  association  is typified by  an  elasticity of 
around  1.3. 
Turning  to  the  financing  side,  Chart  2  shows  over  a  slightly shorter 
period  the  way  in  which  tax  revenue  receipts  have  evolved  relative to  the 
growth  of  GDP.  In  broad  terms,  the  picture  presented  is one  where  the 
elasticity of  tax  receipts  with  respect  to  GDP  is around  1.2 or  below. 
In  other  words,  taking  the  two  trends  together over  the  period  as  a  whole, 
there  has  been  a  persistent  tendency  for  government  deficits to  increase, 
a  fact  which  now  is well-documented. 
This  aspect  is  brought  out  in  starker  fashion  if a  more  recent  sub-
period  1975/81  is  considered.  Chart  3, for  example,  shows  a  relation bet-
ween  the  growth  of  public  sector/GOP  ratio  and  the  growth  of  tax  revenue 
receipts.  The  impression  given  is that,  on  average,  something  like  two 
thirds  of  the growth  in deficits  has  been  covered  by  additional  taxation. 
Those  countries  with  the  Largest  deficits,  Belgium,  Ireland and  Denmark  lie 
well  above  the  simple  regression  line fitted  for  illustrative purposes  (3). 
(3)  For  the  longer  period 1965-81,  the  tax  revenue  financing  proportion 
is  higher  at  around  80  per  cent. -12-
TABLE  1 
TOTAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITURE 
AS  A SHARE  OF  GOP 
(per  cent) 
1960  1973  1981 
Belgium  30.53  39.36  58.96 
Denmark  26.40  42.73  59.65 
Germany  32.40  40.34  49.31 
Greece  23.77  28.90  39.82 
France  34.49  38.46  48.92 
Ireland  26.71  38.99  58.05 
Italy  30.13  37.77  50.81 
Luxembourg  29.32  35.66  59.64 
Netherlands  33.20  49.35  59.29 
U.K.  33.95  41.09  45.39 
U.S.A.  27.72  31.33  33.86 
Japan  18.09  22.31  35.29 C
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Whilst  shares  of total  public  expenditure  and  of total taxation 
have  fluctuated  over  the  sample  periods examined  here,  the  growing  gap 
between  expenditures  and  receipts  in part  is  reflected  now  in  rising 
shares of public  debt  outstanding  in  GDP  of  most  countries  (4).  The 
point  here  is that  additional  expenditures  must  be  paid  for  sooner  or 
later and,  in  this  respect,  the ability to  raise public  revenue  provides 
the  ultimate  constraint  on  public  borrowing.  The  fact  that  historically 
the  public  debt/GOP  ratio  has  fluctuated  widely  over  time  in  many  countries 
does  not  alter the  strength  of  this observation. 
It is  interesting to turn  to a  consideration of  some  changes  which 
have  occurred  within  the totality of  public  spending  in the  Community. 
Table  2 sets out  the  shares  in nominal  terms  of  what  some  might 
regard  as  polar  cases  within  the  existing public  public  sector accounting 
conventions.  Public  sector gross  fixed capital  formation,  for  example, 
is  a  broad  category  which,  in principle,  at  least,  is  closest  to  the 
notion  of  self-financing  expenditure.  A classical  justification for  net 
new  borrowing  by  government  is when  the purpose  is to finance  a  capital 
project,  the  costs  of  which  occur  early wiih  the  expected benefits 
stretching  into the  future.  We  know,  of  course,  that actual  recorded 
public  sector  investment  falls a  long  way  short  of this particular view 
of  productive  expenditure  hence  the national  accounting  analogue  is 
by  no  means  precise. 
(4)  Within  EEC  countries over  the  period  1973-79  only  the  UK  has 
experienced  a  fall  in the  Debt/GDP  ratio  (see  European  Economy, 
November  1982,  Chapter  2). ~
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At  the other  extreme,  social  transfers are  sometimes  thought  of 
as  being  the  so-called "unproductive"  element  in public  spending.  Again 
this  is far  too  naive  in  that  it neglects  not  only  the  economic  effects 
of  raising  the  finance  but  also,  on  the other side,  any  income  generating 
effects on  the  part  of  the  recipients.  Whilst  it would  be  hard  to  argue 
that  social  transfers  have  a  self-financing dimension  in the  same  way  as 
might  an  investment  programme,  the  issue  is not  simply  a  trade-off  issue 
between  equity and  efficiency.  Hochman  and  Rodgers  (1969)  for  example, 
argue  rersuasively that  governments  are much  more  than "legalised Robin 
Hoods"  who  transfer  from  rich  to  poor  and  thus  impose  a  simple  deadweight 
Loss.  In  somewhat  more  formal  terms,  if individual  evaluations of  welfare 
changes  are  not  independent,  that  is to say,  utility functions  are  inter-
dependent,  one  can  envisage easily,  cases  where  everyone  benefits from 
a  social  transfer.  This  possibility they  refer to as "efficient  redistri-
bution"  (5). 
With  these  important  qualifications  in  mind,  what  Table  2  illus-
trates  is  the  steady  increase  in  social  transfer  spending  as  a  share  of 
GOP,  particularly since  1973.  Further, the  share  of  total  resources 
allocated  to  public  sector  fixed  capital  formation  since 1973  has  fallen 
in  six out  of  the  ten  member  countries.  This  decline  has  been  most  pro-
nounced  in  the  UK,  where  the  drop  exceeded  3  percentage points.  Ireland, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  country which  has  done  much  in  the  way  of  providing 
generous  tax  and  other  incentives  to encourage  the  inflow of  private 
foreign  capital  in  order  to  expand  the  productive base,  has  in  the public 
sector  also generated  a  pronounced  rise  in  the  share of  fixed  capital 
formation. 
Public  consumption,  which  in  the  above  terms  might  be  regarded 
as  an  intermediate  spending  category,  follows  a  growth  pattern which  is 
close  to  the  evolution of  public  spending  in total.  The  growth  of  this 
component  relative to  GOP  accelerated  in the  Later  period to  raise the 
share  in  Community  countries  from  around  12  per  cent  on  average  in  1960 
to  roughly  20  per  cent  by  1981.  In  both  Denmark  and  Ireland,  over this 
(5)  The  argument  can  be  extended  to non-transfer  expenditures  also.  The 
so-called "merit  goods",  if supplied  at  less  than  cost  would  be  a 
relevant  category  in this  context. -19-
period,  the  share  of  public  consumption  in  GDP  doubled,  whereas  in 
France,  on  the other  hand,  it increased hardly at all. 
As  we  indicated already,  rough  divisions  such  as  those  used  to 
support  more  or  less  a  priori  views  about  the  worth  of  public outlays 
are  hardly sustainable.  Similar  remarks  are  relevant  when  attempts  are 
made  to  identify  current  and  capital expenditures  with  unproductive  and 
productive activities.  In  terms  of  economic  criteria it would  be 
difficult to argue  that  investment  in  school  buildings  for  example  is in-
herently productive,  whereas  payment  of teachers'  salaries, a  current 
outlay,  is not.  Moreover,  in any  standard project appraisal,  attention 
is  focused  on  cash  flows  which  effectively abolishes  the distinction bet-
ween  current  and  capital outtays.  The  reference  point  is the  expected 
rate of  return relative to  the appropriate  public  sector discount  rate. 
Sufficient  information on  rates of  return  in the public  sector 
is  hard  or  impossible  to obtain and  in  the  absence  of  such  knowledge  a 
very  rough  re-classification of  some  government  expenditures  made  so  as 
to  approximate  a  little more  closely a  'productive'  investment  element 
is given  in  Table  3.  Here  all  public  expenditures  on  Education  plus 
general  government  support  for  Research  and  Development  are added  to 
public  sector gross  fixed  capital  formation.  The  total  is  expressed  as 
a  share of total  public  expenditure. 
Between  1970  and  1978  this share of  what  is  called here  the pro-
ductive part  of total  outlays  fell  in all  Community  countries,  with  the 
exception of  the  Netherlands.  The  decline  is marked  particularly in 
France,  Ireland and  the  UK. 
In  summary,  the picture overall  is one  of  a  substantial  expansion 
in  the  total of  a~ailable resources  absorbed  by  the  public  sector  in the 
Community.  Typically,  the  share of  national  output  accounted  for  by 
general  government  activities exceeds  SO  per  cent  but  within this total, 
broad  accounting  analogues  to  the  "productive"  component  indicate a 
decline over  the past decade.  Current  transfers as  a  share on  the other 
hand  have  risen steadily. TABLE  3 
-20-
General  Government  GFCF  plus  total  public 
Expenditure  on  Education  and  R & D as  share 
of  Total  Public  Expenditure  % 
1970  1975  1978 
Belgium  27  25 
Denmark  28  27 
Germany  29  26 
France  32  26 
Ireland  32  28 
Italy  25  23 
Luxembourg  29  27 
Netherlands  22  25 
United  Kingdom  33  32 
Note:  There  are  many  qualifications  to  the  above;  in  some  cases 
figures  for  the  same  year  are  not  available and  isolation of 
capital  expenditures  is  by  no  means  homogeneous  across  Member 
countries. 
22 
23 
25 
23 
25 
23 
26 
23 
27 -21-
III.  GROWTH:  NOMINAL  AND  REAL 
All  of  the  comparisons  in  the previous  section are expressed  in 
nominal  terms.  However,  in  the measurement  and  appraisal  of  movements 
in  the  share of  public  expenditure  in total  resources  available,  a 
troublesome  problem  arises  when  attempts  are  made  to  incorporate dif-
ferential  price effects.  In  several  respects,  the difficulties parallel 
closely,  the  kind  of  situation which  arises  in a  more  general  inflation 
accounting  context. 
As  is  well  known,  the  basic  problem  arises because  over  a  wide  range 
of  typical  government  expenditure  programmes  there are  no,  or at best, 
extremely  few,  satisfactory measures  of output.  As  a  consequence  it is 
a  convention  in  National  Accounts  methodology  to  use  input  costs  as  a 
proxy  measure  of  public output,  which  implies  zero  productivity growth 
in  the public  sector.  The  resulting price bias or "relative price 
effect"  (RPE)  creates a  number  of  headaches  when  it comes  to an 
evaluation of  the  public  sector  in  real  terms. 
(i)  If  we  start first of all  with  the question - what  do  we  mean  by 
inflation?  - most  would  agree  that the term  is meaningful  only  in the 
sense of  a  sustained  rise  in  the general  price  level.  Alternatively, 
it can  be  thought  of  ~s a  decline  in  the general  purchasing  power  of 
money.  Seen  from  this point  of  view,  at  the micro  Level,  a  firm  for 
example,  could  be  interpreted as  a  body  of  shareholders,  the  interests 
of  whom  rest  primarily  in the  real  value of  distributed profits. 
Namely,  what  are  these worth  in  terms  of  a  basket  of goods.  At  the 
macro  Level,  a  parallel  in the public  sector is that  the shareholders 
here  are  the  body  of  taxpayers.  Since  taxes  are  compulsory  levies, 
the  analogy  is  by  no  means  exact.  Nevertheless,  the  resources  removed 
from  the  taxpayer/consumer  represent  in private opportunities  foregone 
a  loss  of general  purchasing  power.  In  these  circumstances,  one  could 
argue  that  an  appropriate deflator  for  government  expenditure  is some 
form  of  consumers'  price  index.  Changes  in the  real  share of public 
expenditure  will  then  reflect  among  other  things differences  between 
the  consumers'  price  index  and  an  appropriate  index  of  GOP  prices -
the  GOP  deflator. -22-
(ii)  An  alternative stance might  be  taken  by  the  user  of  the  resources 
involved.  The  managers  and  executives  of  a  firm  in  the micro  example 
will  be  interested particularly  in  changes  in  replacement  costs of 
factor  and  material  inputs.  These  are  the  prices  which  they  recognise 
as  affecting  day-to-day decisions  for  internal  control.  Inventories 
typically are  revalued  in this  sense.  At  the national  level,  government 
may  prefer to  evaluate  expenditure  in  terms  of  the costs of  providing 
them  which  as  a  current  cost  accounting notion would  lend  some  support 
to  the  conventions  adapted  already. 
(iii)  Yet  again,  one  can  interpret  public  spending  dS  an  activity which 
makes  claims  on  the  general  pool  of  national  resources  which  should  be 
valued  in  its own  terms.  That  is to say,  public  spending  claims are 
neutral  vis-a-vis any  other  kind  of  spending.  This  is closer to a  real 
national  resource  evaluation  in  terms  of  international  worth  or  com-
petitiveness;  what  collection of  imports  can  a  nation's  resources 
purchase?  In  this  instance,  one  might  prefer to use  the  GOP  deflator 
in order  to  attach  a  real  significance to  government  expenditures. 
This  latter dimension  has  a  statistical basis  in  the  following  sense. 
Because,  public expenditures  in  current prices by  convention  are  approxi-
mated  by  cost  valuations,  an  RPE  adjustment  is usually made  and  which 
represents  what  is  in effect  a  ratio of these  costs  to other prices. 
These  other prices are  national  resource  prices;  the  GOP  price  index. 
What  we  have  then  is  an  ~djustment which  in practical  terms  is  the  same 
as  deflating  current  price public  expenditures  by  the  GOP  deflator. 
The  share of  publix  expenditure  in  GOP  then  is simply  the  ratio of  two 
current  price variables  with  no  differential price effects. 
Turning  to  ~he major  components  of  public  programmes  one  or 
more  of  the  above  considerations  can  apply  and  it is by  no  means  obvious 
as  to  which  one  the  greatest  significance  should  be  attached.  The 
approach  suggested  by  (i)  would  yield  comparisons  dependent  on  the  ratio 
between  the  consumer  prices and  GOP  price  index  in each  case.  (iii)  on 
the  other  hand  would  have  no  adjustments  to  the  current  price ratios. -23-
The  second  variant,  however,  Leads  to  a  range  of possibilities.  One 
could  for  example  deflate  capital  programmes  by  an  investment  goods  price 
deflator, public  consumption  by  an  index  of public  consumption  prices, 
social  transfers  by  a  consumer's  price  index,  and  so on.  In  each  case, 
real  growth  as  a  share  of  GDP  would  embody  a  relative price effect given 
by  the  ratio of  the  programme  price  index  to the  GDP  deflator. 
The  above  examples  represent  what  must  be  only one  set  from  many 
possible alternatives and  it is  readily apparent  that there  is  no  answer 
which  will  produce  a  series of  'golden  numbers'  sufficient  for  all pur-
poses.  In  any  case,  at  a  practical  level,  many  of the  issues  which  are 
raised  are  either  closed or determined  by  what  information  can  be  made 
available. 
Tables  4  and  5  set out  for  three  selected years  some  relative price 
weighted  shares  in  GDP  of  public  expenditure  and  its major  components. 
The  unweighted  shares  taken  from  the  earlier tables  are  reproduced  again 
in  order to  facilitate  comparisons. 
In  the  weighted  series produced  here,  current  expenditure  on  public 
consumption  has  been  deflated  by  the  public  consumption  prices  index. 
For  expenditure on  public  sector gross  fixed  capital  formation,  the 
ordinary  investment  goods  prices  index  is  used  as  a  proxy  (6)  measure. 
Both  public  expenditure overall  and  current  transfers are  weighted  using 
the  consumer  pricES index. 
Considering  the  total  of  general  government  expenditure  first  of 
all, the  figures  in  Table  4  show  that  the  growth  in  share of  GDP  between 
1960  and  1973  always looksgreater  in  consumer  price weighted  terms  than 
in  the  unweighted  series.  In  the  second  sub-period,  1973-1981,  however, 
this position is  reversed  with  the  weighted  series growing  less  fast. 
In this particular  instance,  the  United  Kingdom  is the  single exception. 
Thus,  seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the domestic  taxpayer  who  gives  up 
private  consumption  at  the margin  in urder  to  finance  an  increment  of 
(6)  There  will  be  some  differences  between  this  and  a  true  public  sector 
index  which  would  reflect differences  in  composition  of  assets  bet-
ween  public  and  private  sectors. -24-
TABLE  4 
TOTAL  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITURE 
Unweighted  Share  Percentage  Share  CPI  Weighted  Percentage 
1960  1973  1981  Increase  1960  1973  1981  Increase 
Betgium  30.53  39.36 58.96  28.92  49.79  29.11  39.36  55.86  35.21  41.92 
Denmark  26.40  42.73  59.65  61.86  39.59  24.04  41.78  55.82  73.79  33.60 
W.Germany  32.40  40.34  49.31  24.51  22.22  29.62  40.15  48.16  35.55  19.95 
Greece  23.77  28.09  39.82  21.58  37.78  21.55  29.62  38.26  37.44  27.17 
France  34.49  38.46  48.92  11.51  27.19  33.62  38.51  48.45  14.54  25.81 
Ireland  26.71  38.99  58.05  45.97  48.90  25.02  41.51  56.76  65.90  36.74 
Italy  30.13  37.77  50.81  25.36  34.52  28.56  38.63  51.27  35.26  32.72 
Luxembourg  29.32  35.66  59.64  21.62  67.25  26.18  36.66  58.35  40.00  59.16 
Netherlands  33.20  49.35  59.29  48.64  20.14  30.01  49.53  58.17  65.04  17.44 
U.Kingdom  33.95  41.09  45.39  21.03  10.46  32.86  40.68  47.98  23.80  17.94 
U.S.A.  27.72  31.33  33.86  13.02  8.08  26.50  31.33  33.69  18.23  7.53 
Japan  18.09  22.31  35.29  23.32  58.18  19.85  23.02  31.91  15.97  38.62 
PUBLIC  CONSUMPTION 
Unweighted  Share  Share  PC  Index  Wei~hted 
Belgium 
Denmark 
W.Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
U.Kingdom 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
CPI 
PC 
12.77 
12.66 
13.46 
11.19 
13.00 
11.26 
12.75 
9.72 
13.44 
16.52 
17.36 
8.88 
14.83  19.44  16.13  31.08  14.84 
21.85  27.96  72.59  27.96  18.87 
18.15  20.72  34.84  14.16  18.36 
11.45  17.76  2.32  55.11  14.14 
13.17  15.80  1.31  19.97  17.35 
15.66  21.86  39.08  39.59  14.69 
15.50  18.08  21.57  16.64  16.71 
10.55  17.37  8.54  64.64  12.15 
16.33  17.92  21.52  9.74  23.15 
18.39  22.21  11.32  20.77  21.96 
17.68  20.32  1.84  14.93  21.00 
8.30  10.19  -6.98  12.28  16.68 
Consumer  Price  Index 
Public  Consumption  Price  Index 
15.83  17.65  6.67  11.50 
23.50  27.53  24.54  17.15 
18.86  19.94  2.72  5.73 
12.36  16.19  -14.40  30.98 
14.05  14.43  -23.49  2.70 
17.05  19.74  16.06  15.78 
14.58  14.77  -14.61  1.30 
12.55  15.44  3.29  23.03 
17.64  18.13  -31.24  2.72 
20.20  21.92  -8.71  8.51 
17.66  17.80  -18.91  0.80 
9.24  9.52  -80.52  3.03 -25-
CURRENT  TRANSFERS 
Unweighted  Share  Percentage  Share  CPI  Weighted  Percentage 
1960  1973  1981  Increase  1960  1973  1981  Increase  ----
Belgium  12.71  17.65  26.57  38.87  50.5  12.12  .17. 65  25.18  45.62  4?.66 
Denmark  7.93  15.30  22.53  92.94  47.25  7.22  14.96  21.08  107.20  40.91 
W.  Germany  13.55  15.87  21.29  17.12  34.15  12.39  15.79 20.80  27.44  31.73 
Greece  6.26  8.67  14.73  38.49  69.89  5.67  8.88  14.15  56.61  59.35 
France  16.45  20.77  27.81  26.26  33.89  16.04  20.80  27.55  29.68  32.45 
Ire Land  9.49 15.10  19.22  58.95  27.28  8.89  16.08 18.79  80.88  16.85 
Italy  11.91  16.37  20.59  37.44  25.78  11.29  16.75  20.77  48.36  24.00 
Luxembourg  13.68 18.06  30.55  32.02  69.16  12.22  18.56 29.90  51.88  61.11 
Nether Lands  11.91  2<t.45  31.36 105.29  28.26  10.77  24.54  30.81  127.86  25.55 
U.  Kingdom  9.18 12.13  15.74  32.13  29.76  8.88  12.01  16.64  35.24  38.55 
U.S.A.  6.26  9.80  11.08  56.55  13.06  5.98  9.80  11.02  63.88  12.45 
Japan  4.28  6.44  12.69  50.47  97.05  4.70  6.65  11.48  41.49  72.63 
PUBLIC  INVESTMENT 
Unweighted  Share  Share  Investment  Price Weighted 
Belgium  1.93  3.32  3.70  72.02  11.44  2.15  3.39  3.72  57.67  9.73 
Denmark  3.30  3.67  2.85  11.21  -28.77  3.13  3.90  2.82  24.60  -38.29 
W.  Germany  3.21  3.83  3.43  19.31  -11.66  3.17  3.70  3.25  16.72  -13.85 
Greece  6.05  7.78  4.39  28.59 -77.22  6.89  7.92  3.84  14.95-106.25 
France  2.94  3.43  2.98  16.66 -15.10  2.83  3.55  3.01  25.44  -17.94 
Ire Land  2.82  4.00  7.36  41.84  84.00  2.84  4.48  7.06  57.75  57.58 
Italy  3.63  2.85  3.73 -27.37  30.87  4.17  3.13  3.67  -33.23  17.25 
Luxembourg  4.74  5.60  8~62  18.14  53.93  6.08  6.16  8.76  1.31  42.21 
Nether Lands  4.04  3.84  3.22  -5.21  -19.25  3.63  3.89  3.00  7.16 -29.66 
U.  Kingdom  3.31  5.08  1.87  53.47-.171.66  3.37  5.15  1.98  52.82-160.10 
U.S. A.  2.53  2.10  1.72 -20.47 -22.09  2.  61  2.20  1.  70  -18.36 -29.41 
Japan  4.51  6.39  8.02  41.65  25.51  3.56  6.41  8.00  80.06  24.08 
(4) -M-
government  spending,  the  rise  in  share  over  the  last eight  years  in  the 
Community  appears  just a  little exaggerated if a  nominal  ratio  is  used. 
Seen  from  this standpoint,  a  crude  interpretation would  be  that the 
opportunity  cost  of  government  spending  has  been  falling over  the  recent 
past. 
This  observation  follows  naturally  from  the  behaviour  of  movements 
in  the  GOP  deflator  in  Community  countries  relative to movements  in the 
index  of  consumer  prices.  What  we  find  is that  between  1960  and  1973, 
the  consumer  prices  index  rose  less  rapidly than did  the national  output 
deflator.  Over  the  second  period this process  reversed  in  almost  every 
instance.  But,  when  it comes  to  placing  a  behavioural  interpretation on 
this  change,  for  reasons  discussed already,  the outcome  is not  unambiguous. 
Someone  who  prefers  to analyse  these  changes  in  more  of  a  national 
resources  context  for  example  would  rely on  nominal  ratios and  arrive at 
a  different  conclusion. 
Turning  to expenditures  on  public  consumption,  what  Table  4 
suggests  is  that  in  both  of  the  sub-periods  considered,  the  relative 
price weighted  shares,  using  the  price  index  of  public  consumption  rel-
ative  to  the  GOP  deflator,  show  smaller  rates of  increase  than  do  the 
nominal  ratios.  In  some  instances,  the  comparisons  yield sharply 
contrasting  results - Italy,  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  for 
example. 
Looking  at  the  levels,  for  most  countries,  the  nominal  ratios 
are  smaller  than  the  weighted  ratios  for  1960  and  1973  reflecting the 
fact  that  the  GOP  deflator  rose  faster  than  the public  consumption  prices 
index.  Between  1973  and  1981,  however,  the  roles  changed. 
At  this point,  it  is worth  drawing  some  comparisons  with  another 
interesting  study  in  this general  area, namely  that  by  Heller  (1981). 
Using  a  similar  justification for  the  use  of  relative price  indices 
Heller  covers  the  period  1950-77,  for  a  wider  range  of  countries  but 
including  seven  Community  members.  The  definition of total general 
government  expenditure  used  in  his analysis  is  rather narrower  than 
that  employed  here  insofar as  it does  not  cover  government  expenditures 
on  gross  fixed  capital  formation.  The  exclusion of this  component -27-
reduces  the  share  of public  expenditure overall  in  GDP  by  roughly 
five  percentage  points  (7). 
Up  to  the  year  1977,  Heller  and  Beck  find  that weighted  shares 
are  lower  than the  simple  nominal  ratios,  where  price  indices  relative 
to  the  class of public  expenditure  are  used.  When  a  consumer  price 
index  is applied  as  a  proxy  for  worth  to the  taxpayer,  Heller  finds 
that  the  share  in  GDP  is much  higher  than  either the  nominal  or  'cost' 
weighted  ratios  in Beck's  earlier study.  In  many  instances,  the 
differences  are  considerable,  being  of  the order of  10  - 20  percentage 
points greater  than  the  'cost•  weighted  figures  for  Community  countries. 
The  figures  calculated here  for  the  three selected years  show  far 
less  dramatic  differences.  Table  6  provides  what  is the  clearest example 
for  the  case of  public  consumption.  Where  nominal  public  consumption 
price weighted  and  consumer  price weighted  shares are given.  It can  be 
seen  that the differences  are greatest  in  the  b~se year  1960,  where  the 
'cost'  based  ratio is  larger  than  the  •taxpayer'  based  measure  by 
around  4  percentage  points or  so  on  average.  By  1973,  the discrepancy 
remains  at  around  this order of  magnitude,  but  for  1981,  the  gap  is  very 
small  and  the  measured  difference  is  reversed  in eight  out  of  the ten 
countries. 
Using  Heller's  terminology,  this suggests  now  that  because  the 
public  consumption  price  index  is  rising faster  than  the  CPI,  the 
(7)  The  reader's attention is drawn  also to the  paper  by  Beck  (1979) 
and  on  which  a  part  of  Heller's observations  and  calculations are 
based.  For  total government  expenditure,  Beck  constructs  a  price 
index  based  on  shares  in  the total.  This  is not  done  here. T
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terms  of  trade  between  public  and  private  consumption  is declining  (8). 
In  the  case  of  public  investment,  the decline  in the  post  1973 
period  always  appears  greater  when  the  investment  share  is weighted  by 
the  investment  goods  price  index  relative  to  the  GOP  deflator.  In  the 
earlier period the  comparisons  produce  a  less  clear picture.  Thus,  in 
the  later years,  the  'cost'  view  of  public  investment  would  suggest  that 
too  few  of  national  resources  have  been  channelled  into this outlet. 
Growth  in the  share of  current  transfers within the  Community 
between  1960  and  1973  is always  greater  in  the  consumer  price weighted 
comparison.  In  the  later period,  with  the  exceptions of the  United 
/Kingdom  and  Italy, this  feature  is  reversed.  Given  the  way  in  which 
the  national  output  and  private  consumption  price deflators  have  behaved 
over  the  recent  past,  this  last observation is of  interest.  The  trend 
implies  that  when  measured  in  national  resource  taxpayer  terms,  the 
opportunity  cost  of  transfers  has  been  rising;  the  CPI  has  risen 
relative to  the  GDP  deflator.  One  cannot  conclude  from  this that  re-
distribution  has  gone  too  far  but  the  trend  is at  least  consistent  with 
the  more  recent  expressions  of  concern  about  the  rising  share of  this 
component  in total  public outlays. 
(8)  Heller  op  cit  p.  65.  There  are  some  discrepancies  however  between 
the  figures  here  and  those  used  in the Beck/Heller  papers.  The  OECD 
price deflators  for  public  and  private  consumption  do  not  appear  to 
behave  in the  same  way  as  those  used  in  Beck's  work.  The  ratio of 
the public  to private  indices  for  1960  and  1973  is  less  than  unity 
for  all  EEC  countries,  except  Italy in 1973.  By  1981,  this  ratio 
exceeds  unity  for  all  excepting  Denmark  and  Netherlands.  For  the 
year  1977,  six  EEC  countries  show  ratios  which  exceed  unity,  three 
less  than  unity  (Denmark,  Luxembourg  and  the  UK)  with  W.  Germany 
having  a  public/private price  ratio equal  to  unity.  The  conclusion 
reached  by  Heller therefore  as  at  the  year  1977  would,  on  this basis, 
be  by  no  means  as  clear cut;  in 4 out  of  10  E6C  countries,  his 
comparison  would  be  reversed. -30-
Summarising  this part  of  the discussion,  we  indicated initially 
that  in producing  comparisons  which  purport  to account  for  changes  in 
real  share,  there is  no  cut  and  dried basis  convenient  for  all  require-
ments.  Ultimately,  choice of  price deflator will  depend  on  the  purpose 
in  hand  and  the point  of  view  which  one  wishes  to emphasise.  If, for 
example,  one  feels  that  the  European  taxpayers'  interest is  represented 
in  some  way  by  a  purchasing  power  indicator  relative to the  index  of 
resource  price  in general,  then  the  figures  given  in Table  6  will  have 
a  degree  of  meaning.  An  initial  conclusion  from  1973  onwards  would  be 
that  general  government  expenditure  as  a  share of total  resources  has 
not  grown  quite  as  fast  as  that  indicated  by  the  more  usual  and  simpler 
nominal  comparison.  Again,  from  the private taxpayer  standpoint,  the 
rise  in  share  is slightly  Less  than  that  in "cost" terms.  The  decline 
in  the  share of  public  sector  capital  formation  Looks  greater on  a 
relative price weighted  basis  and  thus  underlines  even  more  the  weakening 
in this  so-called  more  productive  component.  Finally,  the  somewhat 
contentious  growth  of  transfers as  a  share of  GOP  Looks  a  little less 
in  relative price weighted  terms.  These  admittedly  crude  calculations 
are  not  intended to  convey  the  impression  that  standard accounting  con-
ventions  should  not  be  followed.  However,  given  that  there are other 
criteria  involved,  it is possible and  reasonable  to  modify  an  inter-
pretation on  the  more  usually specified trend depending  on  what  the 
precise policy question  happens  to  be. -31-
IV.  CONSTRAINTS  AND  ACCEPTABILITY 
The  introduction noted  that  arguments  concerning  the  role of  oublic 
expenditure  tend  to  raise  somewhat  emotive  issues.  Simplifying  the 
matter  greatly,  one  can  identify  two  important  ways  by  which  conflicting 
pressures  can  arise.  On  the  one  hand,  individuals  may  dislike  the  idea 
of  paying  for  increments  of  expenditure to  certain programmes,  the 
benefits  from  which  may  be  perceived only  dimly.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  these  same  individuals  may  well  favour  and  support  new  prog-
rammes  or  additions  to  existing  programmes.  At  one  and  the  same  time 
we  see  objections  to  cuts  in expenditures  on  roads,  health,  education 
and  so  on,  but  observe  people  feeling  threatened  by  the effects  which 
such  expenditures  may  have  on  their disposable  incomes. 
These  and  other  similar  reactions  are  just manifestations of  some 
of  the  constraints which  operate  on  the growth  of  government  spending. 
The  ultimate  constraining  factor  is  the growth  of  GDP  itself, since  in 
the  long  run  this  sets a  Limit  to  a  nation's taxable  capacity.  Hence 
it is not  surprising to observe  that  the  kind  of  behaviour  mentioned 
becomes  most  obvious  in periods  when  growth  performance  and  expectations 
for  future  growth  are  weak. 
Whilst  there are  important  issues  concerned  with  how  to  identify 
and  improve  the  ~fficiency of  resource  use  in  the  public  sector,  there 
are  other problems  also associated with  the perception and  measurement 
of  public  sector expenditure benefits.  The  fact  that public  sector 
outputs  conventionally approximated  by  input  measures  has  been  referred 
to already.  This  makes  both  public  presentation and  appraisal difficult. 
The  mixture  of  programmes,  some  of  which  are  targeted at  particular 
groups,  whereas  others  have  more  of  a  public  goods  character,  again 
blurs  the  issues of  worth  or acceptability by  the  general  public. -32-
One  could,  in principle,  try to approach  this set of  problems  at 
an  analytical  level  and  then  see  what  information  might  be  brought  to 
bear  on  some  key  parameters  in  the  system.  A preliminary but  never-
theless  highly perceptive attempt  in this  direction is that of Mirrlees 
(1978).  First of all, expenditures  and  taxes  are  classified  in  terms 
of  whether  they  are  related to  income  or not.  Then  within  a  framework 
of  optimal  taxation  theory  with  subsidies  treated as  negative taxes  and 
for  given  assumptions  about  the  share of public  goods  in  GDP  and  the 
elasticity of  substitution between  work  and  leisure,  it becomes  possible 
to  derive  an  "optimal"  tax  rate overall.  When  compared  with  the actual 
tax  rate this provides  one  answer  to the question- is the  public  sector 
too  large or  too  small?  In  a  recent  application to the  UK  public  sector 
for  a  few  selected years,  Mirrlees  concludes  that  in the final  year  1976 
the  degree  of  actual  re-distribution  could  broadly  be  of  the  'right' 
order  of  magnitude  (9). 
Quite  apart  from  formal  modelling,  in order to produce  such  empirical 
analyses  especially on  a  cross-country basis,  a  great deal  of  information 
and  judgment  is  required  since public  sector  accounts  are not  collected, 
ordered or  classified on  income  and  non-income  related basis. 
Certainly,  the  OECD  and  ESA  presentations  do  not  satisfy this  requirement 
and  it is necessary  to  look  for  yet  cruder  and  simpler  approaches  (10). 
Thus,  at  this  stage,  and  in  keeping  with  the descriptive approach 
followed  so  far,  a  small  number  of  indicators are  used. 
(9)  Mirrlees'  actual  remarks  are  ••• "I would  take  the  view  from  this 
calculation that  the  actual  degree  of  redistribution is a  little too 
large  but  a  reasonable  man  could  well  believe that  it is  just  right  or 
perhaps  too  little •••  " 
(10)  Although  the  author  is  engaged  currently on  some  experiments  along 
the  above  lines  as  part of  an  extension of  the material  reported  here, 
it should not  pass  unnoticed that  the optimal  taxation approach  has  its 
critics.  See  for  example  M.  Ricketts  (1981). -33-
(i)  The  Tax  Burden 
A first  and  what  is probably the most  obvious  indicator of 
public  expenditure acceptability or pressure on  the  economy  is that 
provided  by  changes  in  the  tax  burden.  Charts  2  and  3  in  Section  2 
show  how  the  growth  of  tax  receipts  has  not  matched  the growth  of 
public  expenditure overall.  Taking  a  trend  view  and  concentrating  less 
on  individual  years  this  could  be  interpreted as  either governments 
unwillingness  or  inability to  reduce  personal  disposable  incomes  by 
the  amounts  which  would  be  needed  to  cover  additional  spending. 
Government  deficits  have  tended  to  rise in  most  Community  member 
countries  and  the  implied taxation  consequences  for  additional  public 
expenditure  are  used  frequently  now  as  one  means  of  exercising  control 
over  departmental  budgets.  Within  this political  approach,  however, 
there  is an  implied  view  that  public  and  private  spending  are  not  neutral 
and  that  the  individual  faces  what  is  in effect  an  adverse  terms  of  trade 
between  private and  publicly provided  benefits.  Whilst  taxation is the 
oft  quoted  and  used  stick,  there  may  be  little in  the  way  of  a  publicly 
advertise~ carrot  so  that  poor  perception of  benefits  by  the  individual 
and  emphasis  instead  upon  costs  can  be  regarded  in  more  cynical  fashion 
as  a  convenient  weakness  for  control  purposes. 
Although  the  taxation  indicator of  public  acceptability  has  un-
doubted  attractions,  ~ne cannot  divorce its degree  of  meaning  from  the 
way  in  which  the  tax  revenue  is  raised.  Just  as  public  outlays  can  be 
appropriated  inefficiently,  so  taxes  can  be  raised  inefficiently also, 
hence  tax  structure becomes  of  importance.  In  other  words,  if there  has 
been  taxpayer  resistence  and  an  unwillingness  to  use  the  tax  instrument 
by  government,  such  resistence  may  be  due  in part  to  the  way  in which  the 
incidence of  taxation  is perceived. -~-
In  recent  years  several  major  proposals  for  wholesale  tax  reform 
have  been  motivated  largely by  the  unhappy  mixture  of  tax  reliefs, offsets, 
high  marginal  rates  of  tax  in  important  areas of activity and  the  lack 
of  any  unifying practical principle of  a  single tax  base  (11>.  There  is 
a  trade-off  between  optimal  Ramsey-type  taxes  which  may  indeed  demand 
high  marginal  rates  and  administrative simplicity,  which  would  favour 
a  broad  tax  base  with  correspondingly  lower  marginal  rates.  In  many 
countries  at  present  there  is  little in the way  of  consistent  admini-
strative  logic  as  to  choice of  tax base. 
What  might  constitute  limits  to taxation or  taxable  capacity and 
hence  to  the growth  of  public  expenditure  is a  contentious  issue  since 
the steady growth  in  the  tax  burden  suggests  that  any  such  limits  can  be 
applicable only at  a  given  moment.  Further,  what  may  be  of  more  import-
ance  is the  speed  with  which  any  such  perceived  limits  in the shorter 
period  is approached. 
The  simplest  kind  of economic  analysis  would  suggest  that  high 
marginal  rates  and  highly progressive  tax  systems  will  tend  to  create 
the  biggest  disincentives.  Since  many  tax  structures  with  these 
characteristics are associated with  direct  taxes  on  incomes  of  persons 
and  companies,  this  suggests  in  turn that  countries  which  rely most 
heavily on  these will  have  the  great~st difficulty  in  suppporting  new 
government  expenditures  via  revenue  financing.  The  available data, 
however,  on  average,  seems  to  indicate exactly the opposite.  Countries 
such  as  Denmark,  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  outside the 
Community,  Sweden,  which  have  above  OECD  average  tax  burdens,  also 
rely  heavily  on  relatively progressive direct  taxes.  These  countries 
also  support  higher  than  EEC  average public  expepditure  shares.  Thus 
one  could  advance  an  opposing  hypothesis,  namely  that  high  tax  burdens 
are  possible  in progressive structures because  they  lead to greater 
equity.  Electorates will, on  average,  tend  to pay  more  if they 
(11)  See  J.E.  Meade  (1978)  and  U.S.A.  Treasury  (1977>. -35-
perceive greater equality  in  burden  sharing- we  return  to this aspect 
later  in a  slightly different  context. 
Table  7  gives  the  ratio of  total  taxation to  GOP  expressed  as  a 
three-year  moving  average  around  some  sample  years.  The  pattern of  develop-
ment  is  uneven;  Denmark,  W.  Germany,  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom 
show  relatively little change  when  compared  with,  say,  Belgium  and  France. 
It  is difficult therefore  to draw  conclusions  as  simple  as  those  suggested 
from  the above. 
One  feature  worth  noting,  however,  is that  much  of  the  recent  work 
in  the  area  of optimal  income  taxation would  tend  to support  the first 
argument.  The  fact  that  the evidence,  at  least at this  level  of  aggrega-
tion,  is  suggestive of  the  contrary and  implies  that  insufficient  weight 
is  being  placed on  equity  considerations  in the  formal  modelling  (12). 
Despite  this apparently  inconclusive position on  the  influence of 
tax  burdens,  the emergence  of  tax  evasion  and  the  growth  of  the  informal 
or  "black"  economy  as  topical  subjects  for  analysis  should not  pass  un-
noticed. 
Many  would  wish  to associate the existence of  the  .. black"  economy 
with  the general  rise  in  tax  burdens.  It  is worth  remembering  however  that 
in all  European  countries,  real  income  growth  has  in the  recent  past  been 
relatively depressed  also as  have  income  growth  aspirations.  Whilst  the 
role of  incomes  is  looked  at  in  more  detail  in the  following  section,  for 
the  moment  we  can  simply  note  that this matter of  the  black  economy, 
whether  it has  growth  significantly and  wether  it is a  straightforward 
reaction to  tax  burdens  alone,  is itself not  a  clear  cut  issue  (13). 
(ii)  Real  Incomes  and  Consumption 
Closely  linked  to  changes  in the  tax  burden  are  the effects of 
public  spending  on  real  incomes  and  personal  consumption.  Real  post-tax 
incomes  for  example  provides  one  popular  focus  of  attention,  and  Table  8 
(12)  See  M.  Feldstein  (1976) 
(13)  A useful  survey  of  the  literatue relating  toe  EEC  is Smith  (1981). TABLE  7 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
-36-
RATIO  OF  TOTAL  TAXATION  TO  GDP  -
THREE  YEAR  MOVING  AVERAGE 
1966  1973 
32.85  37.96 
31.82  43.16 
32.0  35.75 
23.03  23.92 
34.96  35.76 
27.61  31.30 
27.42  27.71 
30.57  35.47 
36.84  43.53 
31.96  33.70 
27.15  29.85 
17.52  22.07 
1979 
45.19 
44.58 
37.52 
27.38 
41.06 
34.22 
31.31 
46.63 
45.28 
34.48 
30.74 
25.04 TABLE  8 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
U.K. 
-37-
GROWTH  OF  REAL  PERSONAL  DISPOSABLE  INCOMES  (%) 
1981 
1970 
3.60 
3.36 
3.81 
3.13 
3.42 
2.12 
1981 
1973 
2.62 
2.95 
2.88 
2.36 
3.17 
1.  05 -38-
shows  for  six  EEC  countries  how  real  personal  disposable  incomes  have 
evolved  through  the  past decade. 
Comparing  the  two  sub-periods,  we  see  that  from  1973  onwards, 
growth  began  to fall  away  and  only the  Netherlands  maintained  anything 
like a  performance  consistent  with  that of  the whole  decade.  It is  in-
teresting also to  contrast  the growth  of  real  disposable  incomes  in  the 
Netherlands  with  that  in  the  United  Kingdom,  both  of  which  have  ex-
perienced the benefits of  substantial oil  reserves. 
Moving  away  from  incomes  and  turning  to consumption,  again,  there 
are  alternatives  from  which  to  choose.  Personal  consumption  which 
measures  spending  by  persons  from  wages  and  salaries,  self-employment 
income,  profits, transfers and  subsidies,  when  expressed  in real  terms 
is a  widely  used  indicator. 
One  can,  however,  abstract  from  the current  transfer and  subsidy 
element  in this definition to derive a  somewhat  different  concept. 
This  would  correspond  to that  pool  of  resources  which  remains  for 
consumption  which  is privately financed  (14). 
Any  definition of  this  latter version of  consumption  is to  some 
extent  arbitrary since it  ~ill depend  on  exactly what  expenditures  are 
regarded  as  being  publicly or privately financed. 
Table  9  sets out  the  growth  of  real  personal  consumption  for  the 
two  sub-periods.  It also  compares  this with  what  is a  rough  calculation 
of privately financed  consumption;  that  is personal  consumption  after 
current  transfers  have  been  deducted  and.expressed  in real  terms.  In 
order to make  the figures  a  little more  realistic a  somewhat  arbitrary 
demand  weight  of  95  per  cent  has  been  attached to the transfer  component. 
In other words,  the  remaining  5  per  cent  is a  crude  acknowledgement  of 
any  tax  flowbacks  and  savings  by  recipients, e.g, out of debt  interest. 
(14)  Use  of  the  concept  of "privately financed  consumption"  was  made 
in  a  series of  United  Kingdom  Public  Expenditure  White  Papers, 
e.g, "Public  Expenditure  to  1976-77  Cmnd  5178,  London,  December 
1972. -39-
TABLE  9 
GROWTH  OF  REAL  PERSONAL  CONSUMPTION  CRPC) 
AND  OF"PRIVATELY  FINANCED  CONSUMPTION"  CPFC)  % 
1973  1981 
RPC  1960  PFC  RPC  1973  PFC 
Belgium  4.28  3.20  2.36  0.3 
Denmark  4.16  3.21  1.12  0 
Germany  4.92  3.45  2.32  1.75 
Greece  7.04  6.60  3.30  2.22 
France  5.61  4.77  3.47  1.89 
Ireland  3.69  2.66  1.81  0.66 
Italy  5.79  5.1  2.49  1.5 
Luxembourg  4.48  3.30  3.05  0.67 
Netherlands  5.43  2.87  2.81  0.64 
U.K.  2.92  2.44  1.00  0.1 -~-
The  figures  in  Table  9  show  how  severe  the  squeeze  on  resources 
to persons  has  been  over  the past  few  years.  Expressed  somewhat  dif-
ferently,  once  the available  claims  on  total  real  resources  have  been 
met  (private  investment  and  the  external  account),  the  growth  of general 
government  spending  has  been  such  as  to  leave  little room  for  spending 
by  persons  out  of  privately generated  income  flows. 
Real  personal  consumption  growth  in almost  every  case  has  been 
heavily dependent  on  the  growth  of  current  transfers.  When  these are 
removed,  we  see  that  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands 
and  the United  Kingdom  have  through  1973/81  experienced virtually zero 
growth.  Prior to 1973,  every  member  country  generated at  least 2.5 
per  cent  annual  average  growth  from  1960. 
Thus  from  the standpoint  of  the  spending  authority,  namely  govern-
ment  itself, the  use  of  privately financed  consumption  rests  in its 
potential  as  an  indicator of what  the  constraints  on  future  spending 
growth  might  be.  But  to  interpret  the effect  of  public  spending  prog-
rammes  in this  light  is admittedly only one  form  of  presentation,  and 
it is  to  be  noted  that  the privately financed  consumption  concept  is 
simply  the  mirror  image  of  the general  tax  burden.  Moreover,  it has 
exactly the  same  weakness  for  these purposes  insofar as  it embodies  the 
notion  by  implication,  that public  spending  does  not  influence personal 
welfare.  In addition,  no  account  is taken  of  the benefits  to  those 
persons  whose  income  is derived  solely from  transfers, e.g, pensioners. 
V.  Simple  Anatomy 
The  previous  sections  have  set out  a  few  factual  observations 
about  the growth  of  the public  sector  from  the  standpoint of govern-
ment  and  possible perception by  the  individual.  This  part  of  the essay 
tries  to pull  these  various  scraps of  information together  in more  of  an 
interpretative fashion. -41-
There  would  appear  to be  no  shortage of  theories  competing  to 
explain  why  the  public  sector and  government  itself has  grown  in the 
ways  observed.  The  Wagner  and  Peacock/Wiseman  general  approaches  have 
been  referred to briefly already  with  the  ratchet  or displacement  ex-
planations  implying  continuous  if often uneven  growth  in  concentration. 
From  this  stage  in  the  reasoning,  it is useful  to  identify  two  points of 
departure,  both  of  which  throw  some  l.ight  on  what  has  been  happening. 
The  story however  is far  from  complete  and  many  gaps  remain  to be  filled. 
(i)  Voting  and  Income  Dispersion 
Much  of  the  analysis  in this set  of  explanations of  why  the  share 
of  public  expenditure  has  grown  evolves  from  the  role of  equity  consider-
ations.  More  specifically,  the  concern  is to  try and  model  government 
behaviour  on  the basis of  rules  which  might  be  expected  to emerge  from 
organised  behaviour.  Perhaps  the  most  popular  approach  rests on  the 
result  that  in  a  democratic  majority  voting  situation,  the  role of  the 
median  voter  is decisive or dominant  (15).  This  immediately directs 
attention to  the  changing  characteristics of  income  distributions,  a 
topic  about  which  little is  known,  at  least  on  a  systematic  basis. 
Several  different  hypotheses  can  be  developed,  two  of  which  seem 
to  contain  a  good  deal  of  interest. 
Meltzer  and  Richard  (1981)  suggest  that  what  matters  for  the  size of 
government  is  who  finally  chooses  the  tax  rate  (and  hence  the  share  of 
public  spending).  In  an  individual utility maximising  framework,  the 
preferred tax  rate affects  the work/leisure  choice of all others.  In-
creases  in  gross  income  raise  tax  revenue  as  the  tax  raise rises but  net 
income  falls proportionately.  Leisure  becomes  more  attractive at  the 
margin  and  in  the  tower  reaches  of  the distribution,  transfers  become 
more  acceptable as  a  means  of  subsistence  also.  Using  the median  voter 
result, Meltzer  and  Richard  conclude  that  the  size of government  in a 
(15  A different  but  related  strand places  more  emphasis  on  interest 
groups  who  are  able  to  take  advantage  of  lack  of  information or ig-
norance  on  the  part  of  the  wider  electorate.  This  aspect  is not 
pursued  here. -42-
'rational'  world,  is determined  by  the  ratio of  mean  to median  income. 
Thus,  as  mean  post  tax  income  rises  relatively to  the median  so  the desire 
for  redistribution  increases. 
Peltzman  in  his  paper  cited above  distinguishes  between  the effects 
of  within - group  and  between  - group  transfers.  In  very  simple  terms, 
as  inequality within  groups  of  beneficiaries diminishes,  so  the demand  for 
government  spending  increases.  The  argument  is that "more  similar 
interests  in  redistribution broaden  the support  for  i't"  (16).  On  the 
other  hand,  a  reduction of  inequality between  recipients  of government 
transfers and  the group  of  taxpayers  who  finance  it will  tend  to act  in 
the  opposite direction.  Given  these  two  components  of  a  spending  programme 
it is not  possible to  say  how  inr.ome  inequality as  such  will  affect  the 
scale of government  spending.  Peltzman  carries out  of necessity a  highly 
fragmented  but  nevertheless  extremely  careful  series of  inter-country  com-
parisons  which  relates  shares of  public  spending  to  a  variety of  approxi-
mations  to  changes  in  inequality over  long  periods.  His  conclusion, 
albeit  a  tentative one,  is that  the observed  growth  of the  mass  of  so-
called middle  class  has  contributed  to  the  growth  of government.  At  the 
same  time,  when  inequality has  increased,  government  has  increased  in 
scale also  (17). 
Over  a  period as  short  as  twenty  years,  it is hardly possible  to 
test  formally  or  come  to  firm  conclusions  on  any  of  the above.  We  do  not 
know  in  any  general  sense,  who  the median  voter is, or what  his  post-tax 
income  happens  to  be.  Further,  in the  short  run,  one  might  prefer to 
argue  that  it is the growth  of transfers which  reduces  income  inequality. 
The  joint process of  the electoral  cycle and  the  public  expenditure 
planning process  are  such  that  long  series are  needed  if preferences are 
to  be  revealed.  Charts  4  and  5  are  based  on  calculations of  the median/ 
mean  income  ratio for  Belgium  and  the  United  Kingdom  and  taken  from  Biette 
(16)  Peltzman  op  cit  p.232. 
(17)  Th~ reader  is  referred to  the  series of  exercises  contained  in the 
article cited  for  further details,  coverage,  methodology,  etc.  .  ..  .. ~
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et  al  (1982).  The  movements  of this  ratio and  the  share of  current 
transfers  in  GOP  (18)  do  not  in  any  sense  constitute a  test of  the  kinds 
of  hypotheses  suggested.  Yet,  for  the  United  Kingdom,  in particular, 
there  is  some  suggestion of  an  association between  the  two  variables, 
albeit  a  tentative one. 
In  the  same  vein,  another  piece of  information  runs  along  the 
following  lines.  Some  work  by  van  Praag  et al  (1980)  which  is  based  on 
EEC  surveys  of  income  and  living  conditions  generates a  set of  estimates 
of  the  so-called poverty  line  in  several  Community  countries.  In 
addition,  the  authors  provide  calculations of  the  ratio of  minimum 
(poverty  line)  income  to  mean  income  for  a  four  person  household  (two 
adults  plus  two  children)  for  the  year  1976.  Chart  6  is a  scatter 
diagram  which  plots  these  particular estimates of dispersion against  the 
current  transfer/GOP  ratio for all  Community  countries  with  the exception 
of  Greece.  Once  again,  the  interpretation is not  entirely unambiguous. 
The  apparent  negative association  could  be  thought  of  in two  ways. 
Looked  at  in  terms  of  what  might  be  called the  supply  of  spending, 
those  countries  with  the  lowest  dispersion  could  require  a  lower  current 
transfer  GOP  ratio.  From  a  demand  viewpoint,  however,  the greater the 
dispersion  between  poor  and  average,  the greater the  demand  for  transfer 
expenditure.  Thus,  whilst  not  cast  in  a  median  voter or median/average 
income  mould,  the  latter interpretation would  be  closer  to  a  Meltzer/ 
Richard  and  Peltzman  explanation.  The  two  •outliers•  Italy and  Ireland, 
for  example,  which  are normally  regarded  as  being  relatively poor  in 
Community  terms,  appear  to  be  remarkable  similar  in the  sense  as 
described.  Denmark,  w.  Germany  and  the United  Kingdom  which  are  perhaps 
a  fairly homogeneous  sub-group  have  greater  income  dispersion than  Italy 
and  Ireland,  but  roughly  similar  current  transfer/GOP  ratios. 
C18)  The  Meltzer-Richard  and  Peltzman  formal  models  assume  that 
taxation  is to  finance  transfer  spending  only. C
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We  have  then  an  admittedly  inconclusive position where  this 
broad  approach  matters,  but  there  remains  a  few  features  which  are  not 
inconsistent  with  the  more  interesting  hypotheses  suggested  within  the 
voting  power  framework. 
(ii)  Public  Goods  Interpretations 
Turning  now  to  a  second  approach,  increasing  concentration  in 
government  is  seen  as  being  an  outcome  of  politicians, decision makers 
and  bureaucrats discretionary behaviour.  In  the  conventional  form  which 
most  discretionary  models  take,  spending  and  the  size of  budgets  income 
arguments  in administrators utility functions.  Competition  between 
spending  departments  of  governments  leads  to ever-expanding  state 
expenditures.  The  empirical  support  for  this  hypothesis  is at  best 
rather  weak  (19)  and  the  approach  does  not  take  account  of  the  fact  that 
much  of  the  increased  concentration  in  government  historically seems  to 
have  occurred  as  a  result  of  discreet  Peacock/Wiseman  effects. 
More  persuasive  and  related to  the  basic  character of  publicly 
provided  goods  is  the  explanation  suggested  by  Baumol  in  his  influential 
paper  (Baumol  1967).  Assuming  away  measurement  problems  for  the  moment, 
the  argument  rests essentially on  differences  in  the  inherent  production 
technology  of  private  and  public  goods.  The  former  can  benefit  from 
sustained  increases  in productivity per  man  hour  which  accommodate  more 
rapid  increases  in  real  earnings.  Public  goods  production,  however,  does 
not  have  these advantages  to  anything  Like  the  same  extent.  Using  one  of 
Baumel's  examples,  although  significant  innovations  do  occur  in  the 
teaching  classroom,  it is hard  to envisage  primary  school  classes  rising 
significantly above,  say,  50,  without  causing  disquiet. 
One  may  wish  to  argue  against  this  by  noting  again  as  pointed 
out  in  Section I, that  in practice  we  conventionally assume  that 
(19)  Peltzman  (1980)  contains  a  useful  discussion on  this point. -48-
productivity growth  in  the greater part of  the public  sector  is  equal  to 
zero.  Quite  apart  from  public  enterprises  where  this clearly is  not  a 
legitimate  assumption,  there are  other  important  areas  where  this 
weakness  is  exposed.  Private  sector  service  industries  such  as  banking 
and  insurance  for  example  have  enjoyed  marked  productivity gains  in 
recent  years  and  there  is no  continuing  reason  as  to  why  similar activities 
in  the  public  sector  should  not  have  experienced~  gains  also.  Never-
theless,  the  Baumol  thesis  has some  validity so  long  as one  Sector  remains 
technologically superior  and  to this extent  the  issue becomes  an  empirical 
one.  In  the  face  of difficult, if not  wholly  impossible,  obstacles  to 
the  measurement  of  public  sector outputs  in  many  important  spending  areas, 
this  issue  is  likely to  remain  unresolved;  at  least over  the  foreseeable 
future. 
Thus,  although  there  is  much  oversimplification in this as  Baumol 
and  others  recognise  full  well,  a  tendency  for  real  earnings  in  the 
technologically  less  progressive  sectors  to  chase  and  keep  up  with  those 
in  the  private sector will  have  implications  for  growth  at  the macro-
economic  level.  Balanced  growth  can  be  achieved  only  if  labour  is trans-
ferred  continuously  to  the  Less  progressive  (public)  sector.  In this 
situation where  the  outputs  of  the  two  sectors maintain  a  constant  ratio, 
this  will  retard national  growth  (20).  Thus  costs  per  unit  of output  in 
the  public  sector  have  an  almost  natural  tendency  to  rise  relative to 
other  costs.  If the  process  continues,  costs overall  tend  to  rise also. 
The  various  factors  influencing  growth  of  the public  sector within 
the  broad  class  of  approaches  noted  at this stage  can  be  described  by  a 
segment  of  the  simple  general  relationship of  the  kind  illustrated in 
Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980  page  326).  We  could,  for  example,  write: 
G  =  F  CY;  D;  N;  RP)  ( 1) 
(20)  Baumol  op  cit pp.  418/419.  The  argument  is discussed at  length 
also  in  Baumol  and  Oates  1975  Chapter  16. -49-
where  G  =  real  per  capita government  spending 
D  =  a  distribution of  income  variable 
N  =  population 
RP  =  relative price of  public  goods 
The  factor  D having  been  discussed already,  we  can  focus 
attention on  the  sub-set  denoted  by  the arguments  Y,  N and  RP.  The 
first  two  are  components  in a  possible explanation of a  "Wagner-type" 
relationship,  the  second  in  a  Baumol-type  variant.  Giving  this  more 
explicit expression,  we  could  say 
tJ(  !  r 
G  =  AY  N  RP  (2) 
with  A as  a  constant,  and  in  terms  of  an  expenditure  share 
log  G - log  Y = log  A +  (DC  - 1)  log  Y + flog  N  +  Y log  RP  (3) 
Thinking  cr  a  Communitycross-sectional exercise,  at  the 
national  Level  one  has  ten observations only which  rules out  a  fully 
fledged  statistical exercise.  Adopting  therefore what  is very  much  an 
ad  hoc  stance and  looking  at  the  components  individually,  we  can  note 
the  folLowing. 
Chart  I  in  the  Overview  section 2  suggested,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  over  the past  twenty  years  the growth  of  public  expenditure  with 
respect  to  GDP  produces  an  elasticity of  around  1.25.  Next,  a  simple 
scatter diagram  relating population growth  to growth  in  the  share of 
government  spending  in  GDP  for  EEC  countries 1960-81  produces  no 
discernable trend.  At  this  level  of  argumentation  we  can  therefore 
assume  f  =  0. 
The  coefficient~ is more  of  a  problem  but  something  along  the 
following  lines  seems  to  emerge.  Table  10  sets out  the  growth  in the 
ratio of  the  public  consumption  price rleflator  relative to  the  national 
output  deflator  for  the whole  and  one  sub-period  (21). 
(21)  The  public  consumption  prices  index  here  is  used  as  a  rough  proxy 
for  a  general  government  expenditure price  indicator. -50-
Table  10 
Growth  of  RPE  % 
1960-81  1973-81 
Belgium  1.3  2.1 
Denmark  1.9  1.5 
West  Germany  1.8  1.0 
Greece  1.7  2.5 
France  1.9  2.2 
Ireland  2.0  2.7 
Italy  2.4  2.1 
Luxembourg  2.5  / 3.8 
Netherlands  2.7  0.9 
United  Kingdom  1.6  1.4 
Relating  these  figures  to  the  1rowth  of  log  G - log  Y in a 
simple  two  variable  log  linear  regression  over  the  whole  period yields 
an  elasticity of  0.4  but  which  is statistically insignificant.  For 
the  sub-period  1973-81,  the  estimated elasticity is 0.64  but  this  time 
is significant.  The  scatter diagram  for  the  second  of  these  is produced 
as  Chart  7  (22). 
With  observations  such  as  these,  little can  be  said  in  any 
concrete  sense.  If,  however,  we  indulge  in  a  little 'speculative 
activity'  and  take  as  "guesstimates'"', 
o(  =  1.2 
¥  =  0.5 
these  imply  for  equation  (3)  that  the  share of general  government 
expenditure  in  GOP  has  a  more  recent  tendency  to  increase with  a 
(22)  Using  the  share of  public  consumption  in  GOP  as  the  dependent 
variable yields  a  statistically significant  higher  estimated 
elasticity of  0.78. C
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response  rate of  around  0.7  via  a  combination  of  Wagner  income  and 
Baumel  relative price effects.  If the  GOP  or  income  elasticity is 
unity  we  are still left with  a  positive  response of 0.5  (23). 
A related and,  in  some  respect~, more  controversial  issue is 
whether  the  'Baumol-type'  effects  may  have  inhibited national  economic 
growth.  Chart  8  for  the  ten  Community  countries  shows  that  in the two 
periods  considered,  there  is  a  great  deal  of variability.  Italy,  France, 
West  Germany  and  Belgium  have  experienced  roughly  similar  rates of growth 
of  per  capita  GOP.  They  have,  however,  e¥perienced  somewhat  different 
relative price effects.  Over  the whole  sample  period on  the other  hand, 
Greece  and  Belgium  with  relatively higher  per  capita output  growth  have 
relatively  lower  public/private price differentials.  In  the  cases  of 
the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg,  the  reverse applies.  The  United  Kingdom 
occupies  what  appears  to  be  a  somewhat  contradictory position  in both 
instances. 
Over  the total  period  1960-81,  Chart  8  suggests  a  broadly 
negative  relationship between  the  growth  of  GOP  per  head,  and  growth 
in  the  relative price effect.  Through  the  shorter  sub-period 1973-81, 
this association is apparently  reversed.  It is possible that  because 
a  faster growth  of national  output  is  likely to  result  in faster pro-
ductivity growth  in  the private sector, this will  increase the  relative 
price effect.  It  may  be  that this explanation  could  account  for  the 
scatter of points  1960-81,  whereas  the  'Baumol-type 1  effect would  find 
greater  support  in the sub-period  1973-81  when  output  growth  became 
more  depressed. 
(23)  Note  this  is not  the  result  opinioned  in Peltzman  op  cit whose  view 
that  log  G - Log  Y is a  constant  rests  on  a  "Wagner"  coefficient of 
significantly less than unity.  Experience  and  evidence  cited over  the 
post-war  years-rn-European nations does,  on  the  face  of it, run 
counter  to this view.  Indeed,  even  if the  Relative Price  Effect  is 
zero  here,  there  remains  a  positive  GOP  response. C
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Quite  apart  from  the  two  sets of  possible motives  discussed  above, 
there  is  no  shortage  of  room  for  other  reasons  as  to  why  the public 
sector  has  developed  in  size.  The  Peacock/Wiseman  approach  has  been 
mentioned  already and  a  variant  on  the  could  be  developed  along  the 
following  lines. 
It is  possible  that  both  individuals  and  governments  perception 
of  underlying  economic  performance  overall  takes  quite  some  time  to adjust. 
The  pressures  which  have  built up  and  which  manifest  themselves  now  in 
a  desire  to  reduce  government  spending  are  in part  a  product  of  aggregate 
economic  performance  through  the  past  decade.  One  wonders  whether  such 
pre~sures would  have  emerged  if the  growth  experience of  the  1950s  and 
1960s  had  been  broadly maintained.  Wfth  the benefit of hindsight  one 
can  see  now  that  it took  a  long  time  to realise that  the 1973  oil price 
shock  for  exa.pte precipitated rather  more  than  just a  usual  and  up  till 
then  conventional  adverse  phase  of the  cycle.  Thus,  on  the one  hand, 
individuals  discover  or  feel  eventually that the  benefits  which  they 
expect  fail  in  some  sense  to match  the  costs  as  they  perceive  them. 
On  the other, it takes  government  some  time  to appreciate  that  policy 
changes  of  a  more  structural nature  may  be  necessary.  Rather  than  there 
being  a  sudden  displacement  or  Peacock/Wiseman  "ratchet",  what  we  may  be 
seeing  now  is  the  result  of  perceptions on  both  sides  changing  where 
the  lags  in  realisation have  been  long.  In  short,  through  the  past 
decade  the  potential  desire  for  change  may  have  been  increasing  and  this 
could  be  at  the  point  of  realisation at  the present  juncture.  This  does 
not  rule out  either the  role of  inequality or  the public  goods  explanations 
as  contributing  factors.  Either  or  both  would  be  broadly  consistent  with 
such  an  explanation over  the period  considered  here. 
Summarising  thi;s  part, what  we  have  done  is  to  make  some  suggestions 
as  to  what  might  have  happened  to  the public  expenditure  share  in  GDP 
in  behaviourial  terms.  Two  broad  classes  of  approach  are  identified 
and  a  few  small  and  highly  incomplete  pieces  of  information  in  a  fashion 
serve  to illustrate the arguments.  One  must  recognise that at best,  the 
procedures  adopted  here  are  little more  than  attempts at  some  rather -55-
rudimentary  detective work,  but  they  do  highlight  a  few  issues of  some 
interest and  possible  importance.  The  role of  inequality  should  not  be 
dismissed entirely,  neither  should  the  strength  of  the  relative price 
effect  and  the apparent  tendency  of  government  to  increase  in size with 
GDP  growth. 
VI.  Appraisal  and  Concluding  Comments 
In  the  European  Community,  the  composition of general  government 
spending  has  changed  a  good  deal  over  the  past  two  decades.  Of  at  least 
equal  significance is the  more  or  less  continuous  rise in the size of 
government  at  least  as  suggested  by  the share of  public  spending  in  GDP. 
Some  attempts  at  statistical  refinement  to allow  for  alternative inter-
pretations  of  inflation alter the  compositional  changes  in  some  respects. 
~n particular,  the observed  decline  in  capital  spending  could  be  a  little 
understated,  whereas  the  rise  in  current  transfers  could  be  somewhat  over-
stated.  However,  there is no  hard  and  fast  rule and  the  stance adopted 
depends  on  what  questions  are  being  asked.  A comparison  made  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  user of  resources,  namely  government,  might  well  look 
different  from  a  comparison  made  from  the  standpoint  of  the  supplier -
the  taxpayer. 
An  interesting and  obviously  important  question is  why  the  role 
of  public  spending  has  increased  so  steadily,  such  that  a  share  in  GDP  of 
around  SO  per  cent  is  now  typical  for  the  Community.  If preferences  are 
truly  revealed  by  what  has  actually happened,  one  might  wish  to  argue 
that  this  is what  public  in general  has  desired  and  two  indicators of  what 
is  called here,  acceptability, are  the  rise in the  tax  burden  in aggregate 
and  the  comparatively  slow  growth  of  real  private  consumption  net  of 
transfers  (24).  Both  of  these effects became  more  pronounced  after 1973 
as  the  tables  and  supporting material  indicate.  Yet,  the  tax  burden  has 
not  kept  pace  with  total  spending,  hence  the  rise in government  debt 
in all  but  one  member  country. 
(24)  Certainly,  the  tax  burden  in all  countries  exceeds  greatly the 
famous  25  per  cent  'limit'  expressed  by  Colin  Clark. -56-
In  rather  more  behaviourial  terms,  two  broad  classes of  explanation 
have  been  discussed.  One  sees  the  increase  in government  influence as 
being  the  rational  response of  a  voting electorate where  inequality is 
a  motivating  force,  making  for  higher  raxes  and  transfer  spending.  The 
other  is set  more  in  a  public  goods  framework  and  stresses  the  potential 
importance  of  income  and  relative price effects.  The  various  strands of 
information outlined  here  cannot  provide wholly  convincing  support  for 
either of  these.  But,  they  do  not  reject  them  either.  It is not  un-
reasonable  to  think  that  the  rise  in transfer spending  has  been  related 
to  a  desire  for  more  equality through  the  late 1960s  and  1970s.  Further, 
the  strength  of  the  observed  relative price effects  is on  commonsense 
grounds  likely to be  related to the  rise in share of total public  spending. 
Whether  this  leads  via  a  "Baumol-type"  effect  to  a  lower  growth  of  real 
GOP  is  more  problematic  and  it is doubtful  whether  the existing national 
accounting  conventions  will  enable one  to  throw  further  light  on  the 
matter.  The  unhappy  and,  in  some  cases,  unhelpful  distinction between 
current  and  capital  spending  and  the  implications  for  the  unproductive 
versus  productive  spending  division  have  been  noted. 
One  is entitled to ask:  where  does  all  this  lead?  It is easy 
to  criticise individually each  piece of the essentially illustrative 
material  presented  here,  since  the whole  topic  is bedevilled  by  the old 
problem  of  causality - the  identification problem.  Does  public  spending 
as  such  inhibit  growth  or  is it those  countries  which  grow  who  can  support 
the  more  buoyant  spending  programmes?  Perhaps  one  can  venture  an  opinion 
on  this  by  setting out  a  series of  summary  observations  about  the  public 
sector  in  the  EEC  over  the past  decade.  Countries  vary  in  experience but 
what  might  be  called a  Kaldorian  stylised parable would  run  as  follows:-
(i)  The  share of  public  spending  in  GOP  has  risen  steadily in all 
countries; 
(ii)  The  share vf  taxes  has  risen  less  so 
(iii)  The  share of public  investment  in both  total  spending  and  GOP 
has  declined; 
Civ)  The  shares  of  the  non-financing  part,  current  transfers  have  risen; 
(v)  The  stock of debt  outstanding  as  a  share of  GDP  has  increased over 
the past  decade  in all  but  one  member  country; <vi)  The 
<vii)  The 
the 
(viii)  The 
the 
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share of  debt  interest payments  in total  spending  is  rising; 
structure of  debt  outstanding  seems  to be  weighted  more  towards 
shorter  maturing  claims; 
relative price effect  has  increased more  or  less steadily over 
past  twenty  years; 
Cix)  National  productivity growth  has  declined. 
If any  one  country  was  characterised  in part  by  just a  sub-set  of 
say  four  of  the above,  the matter  would  warrant  some  attention.  There 
are quite  reasonable grounds  for  believing that  the  European  Community 
considered  as  an  entity is characterised to a  greater or  lesser extent 
by  all of  them!  When  one  adds  the  fact  that  in all  countries profitability 
in  the  private sector  has  been  and  is  low  also,  the  underlying  implications 
become  clearer. 
The  productive  base  of  the  European  Community  has  and  is being 
weakened  and  it would  appear  that  the  evolving  shape  of the public  sector 
has  been  one  of  the  contributing  factors.  One  cannot  argue  that it has 
been  the major  factor  but  some  of  the  symptoms  of  poor  economic  perfor-
mance  can  be  seen  through  the  public  sector  itself as  the points  above 
illustrate. 
Undoubtedly  there  is a  need  which  is becoming  increasingly  recog-
nised  to  reverse  some  of  these structural  or  compositional  trends and  the 
imbalance  between  public  investment  and  transfers  is a  prominent  example 
(25).  In periods  of  poor  growth  or stagnation when  economic  aspirations 
are depressed,  one  can  argue  properly that all groups  should  bear  a  part 
of  the  burden.  This  view  lies in part  behind  some  of  the  calls for 
reduction  in  transfer  spending.  However,  the  scope  for  both  transfers 
and  for  taxation is very  much  a  function of growth  in  the  resource  base 
and  this is a  function  of  factor  inputs.  Thus  it makes  little sense  in 
economic  terms  to  forego  for  long  periods  the opportunity of  expanding 
(25>  See  also "European  Economy"  No.  18  November  1983  for  a  restatement 
of  this view.  · -58-
the  pool  of national  resources.  This  is in effect what  cuts  in  capital 
programmes  are doing  in  the  current  circumstances.  Unlike  one  or two 
of  the  less  developed  nations one  believes  that  insolvency  in the  indus-
trialised community  is a  hypothetical  state of affairs being  a  terminal 
point  of  no  real  significance.  Of  much  more  importance  as  a  practical 
matter  is  the  apparent  fact  that  the path  which  a  major  part  of  the  public 
sector  is on  is not  a  desirable one  and  if a  new  trajectory is preferred 
then  some  conscious  policy adjustment  is required  sooner  or  later. 
The  easiest  thing  to  forego  is  jam  tomorrow. -59-
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